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I.  Introduction 
Ever since prospect theory first emerged onto the scene, economists have come to 
understand that important economic decisions can be substantially altered by the way in 
which information is framed.  Perhaps the best-known example was offered by Tversky 
and Kahneman  (1981), who showed that presenting a public policy choice in terms of 
“lives saved” versus “lives lost” dramatically shifted the proportion of the respondents 
who supported a given policy.  More generally, numerous experimental findings suggest 
that individuals make decisions not based solely on the consequences or outcomes – as 
would be predicted by traditional economic theory – but also based on how the choices 
are framed.  
In the retirement arena, recent experimental evidence has shown that, here too, 
framing can influence the relative desirability of particular financial choices.  For 
example, Brown et al. (2008) show that when payout lifetime annuities are presented in a 
frame that emphasizes consumption features, these annuities are perceived to be more 
attractive than non-annuitized assets.  In contrast, when such products are presented in an 
investment-oriented frame, the majority of respondents prefer the non-annuitized 
alternative.  In an experimental setting, Agnew et al. (2008) also show that framing that 
highlights the negative features of annuitization makes individuals less likely to choose 
them.     
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In this project, we apply the concept of framing to an important financial decision 
that approximately 93% of all Americans will make as they enter into retirement:1 when 
to claim Social Security benefits.  In the U.S. Social Security system, individuals are 
entitled to claim benefits as early as age 62, but they can also defer the age at which they 
claim to as late as age 70.  Monthly benefit levels are adjusted for one’s claiming age, 
and these adjustments can be substantial:  for example, an individual who stops working 
at age 62 but waits to claim benefits at age 70 will receive 76% more (real) dollars per 
month for the rest of her life, than if she claimed benefits at age 62.  This adjustment is 
said to be “actuarially fair,” in that the expected presented value of the two streams of 
benefits will be equal for individuals with average population mortality.2
Though financially the two benefit streams are designed to be equal in expected 
present value for the average individual, they are generally not equivalent when viewed 
through an expected utility framework.  Heterogeneity of economic circumstances and/or 
preferences can lead to different optimal claiming ages for different individuals (e.g., 
Coile et al. 2002; Hurd et al. 2004).  For example, liquidity constrained individuals with a 
high disutility of labor and above-average expected mortality rates may find it optimal to 
claim early.  In contrast, risk averse consumers with non-annuitized financial wealth may 
find it optimal to delay claiming because delayed claiming is effectively akin to 
  
                                                 
1 According to the Social Security Administration, 93% of all U.S. workers in 2010 were covered under the 
U.S. Social Security system. (http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/basicfact.htm)  
2 This project abstracts from the question of whether additional years of work would change future benefits, 
as well as the question of how delayed claiming might influence spousal and survivor benefits. This is 
because we are focused here only on how individual claiming might vary with different frames. In a recent 
survey, 75%  of respondents indicated that they understand that benefits need not be claimed at the time 
they stop work (Greenwald et al. 2010b). 
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purchasing additional amounts of inflation-indexed annuitized income that will last for 
life, which the literature on annuities suggest would be welfare-enhancing for many.3
Rather than assuming that the choice of one’s claiming date is a purely rational 
outcomes-based decision, we posit that individuals may be sensitive to the manner in 
which claiming information is framed.  To study this, we have devised an experiment 
which presents individuals with alternative information formats about how benefits are 
adjusted if they were to claim benefits early versus later. These alternative frames are 
shown to participants in the RAND American Life Panel (ALP), an internet-based 
survey.  Panel participants were randomized into one of 10 groups, and each group was 
presented the same underlying claiming information but in different frames.  It is 
important to emphasize that the underlying financial information provided to participants 
– namely, the monthly benefit they would receive at alternative ages – was unaffected by 
the frame: only how this information was presented was altered.  We then asked the 
participants at what age they would claim benefits given each frame, and we compare 
results to determine if the frame seems to alter anticipated claiming ages. 
  
The first of the ten frames we designed serves as a “baseline,” by depicting the 
information as neutrally as possible.4
                                                 
3 The annuity literature is lengthy and rich, beginning with Yaari (1965) and most recently including 
Davidoff et al. (2005) and Horneff et al. (2007, 2009). 
 This frame is quite similar to the approach currently 
(since 2008) used by the Social Security Administration in its public information on 
claiming.  The second frame we designed to emphasize a “breakeven” concept, i.e., an 
approach that emphasizes the minimum number of years one would need to live in order 
for the nominal sum of the incremental monthly payments that arise from delay to offset 
the income forgone during the period of delay. This approach emphasizes the financial 
4 We recognize that even “neutral” frames may not always be perceived as neutral by the general public.   
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aspect of the decision – indeed, framing it similar to a risky gamble – while downplaying 
insurance aspects of the choice.  The breakeven approach is consistent with how Social 
Security claims representatives often presented this choice to potential claimants, at least 
prior to 2008.  This approach is also used in the private sector financial advice and 
planning industry (c.f., Charles Schwab, 2010).   
The remaining eight frames present to respondents combinations of differences 
along three dimensions: (i) consumption versus investment; (ii) gains versus losses; and 
(iii) older versus younger reference ages.  The first of these is motivated by the work of 
Brown et al. (2008) where they found important differences in the reported attractiveness 
of life annuities, depending on whether these were described using “consumption 
language” or “investment language.”  The second dimension uses “gain” versus “loss” 
languages to portray the actuarial adjustment for later versus earlier claiming. The third 
dimension varies the initial age used to “anchor” individuals in the presentation.        
In all frames, respondents are provided with a “sliding scale” showing monthly 
benefit amounts at all ages between 62 and 70 (in monthly increments).  An individual 
can use a computer mouse to slide along the scale and watch the benefits change with 
each claiming age.  The initial “starting point” for the claim age indicator matches the 
reference age provided in each frame.  After viewing a frame, individuals are asked to 
use the sliding scale to pinpoint the age at which they think they are most likely to claim 
benefits.  (Screen shots of the frames and the slider are presented in Appendix A).   
We find several important differences across frames.  The single largest effect is 
that using the “breakeven analysis” leads to substantially earlier expected claiming dates 
than any of the other nine frames.  For example, relative to the baseline “neutral” frame, 
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showing the respondents a breakeven frame leads people to say they will claim earlier, by 
12-15 months (depending on specification).  The magnitude of this result is quite large 
compared to prior estimates of how changes in economic variables influence retirement 
dates.5
Smaller, but still significant, differences obtain across other frames.  Joint tests 
indicate that, overall, presentation of gains leads to later claiming than losses.  We also 
find evidence of an “anchoring” effect with regard to age.  For example, we find that 
presenting respondents with a later age, from which they can then evaluate benefit 
changes, tends to have the effect of getting them to claim later. We find that presenting 
respondents with a consumption gain frame anchored at age 66 yields the highest 
claiming age, though several others also generate significantly later claiming ages than 
the neutral frame (e.g. the investment gain frame with anchoring at 66, and both the 
consumption loss and investment loss frame at 70.)  The breakeven approach used in the 
past by SSA seems to lead to substantially earlier claiming – compared to the neutral 
frame, the breakeven frame appears to induce claiming around one year earlier. 
   
These findings are important for our understanding of economic behavior and also 
for practical policy purposes.  At an academic level, we provide further evidence that 
even high-visibility, high-stakes
                                                 
5 For example, Coronado and Perozek (2003) find that each additional $100,000 of unexpected gains from 
stocks is associated with retiring only two weeks earlier than expected.  Lumsdaine and Mitchell (1999) 
review the literature on the economic determinants of retirement behavior and conclude that changes in 
pension and Social Security benefits have small economic impacts on the choice of retirement age, as do 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2004; 2008). The present analysis focuses on Social Security benefit claiming 
decisions, as distinct from retirement decisions, and one might expect the claiming elasticity to be larger 
than the retirement elasticity. A few analysts (Benitez-Silva and Frank, 2008; Honig and Reimers 1996) 
examine interactions between claiming and work patterns but they are interested in rewards to continued 
employment, whereas here we explore determinants of the claiming decision independent of the return-to-
work decision.   
 financial decisions – in this case, when to claim Social 
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Security benefits – are sensitive to how the information is presented.  One interpretation 
of our results is that they cast doubt on the purely economic model of decision-making, 
by showing that individual decisions are influenced by factors other than ultimate 
consumption outcomes.  At a practical policy level, our study indicates that the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) as well as other public or private sector actors can present 
information to participants in ways that can strongly influence behavior -- even when the 
actual information content is unchanged.  This is particularly relevant for an agency such 
as the SSA that prides itself on providing relevant information without providing 
“advice.” Our findings suggest that individuals are very likely to adjust their claiming 
behavior, depending on how the information is presented.   
In what follows, Section II provides a very brief primer on how Social Security 
benefit claiming works, including a discussion of the actuarial adjustment process.  In 
Section III, we discuss our research methodology including details about the RAND 
American Life Panel.  In section IV, we explain the motivation underlying our choice of 
the 10 frames that we tested.  Results are discussed in section V, and a short conclusion 
appears in Section VI.   
 
II. Social Security Benefits and Claiming    
How Social Security benefits are adjusted depending on the claiming date 
A covered worker who has contributed to the Social Security system for 
sufficiently long (roughly 10 years to be fully insured)6
                                                 
6 Technically, an individual is considered fully insured once they have earned 40 “quarters of coverage.  In 
2010, an individual earns a quarter of coverage – up to a maximum of 4 per calendar year – for each $1,120 
of covered earnings.  See 
 confronts a range of choices 
regarding when he can file for, or “claim,” his Social Security benefits. Age 62 is the 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/QC.html for more information. 
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earliest that one can claim as a retired worker, and this is also known as the “Early 
Retirement Age” (ERA). The rules also specify a Normal Retirement Age (NRA) at 
which “full” or unreduced benefits can be paid; if the worker claims prior to that age, 
payments are reduced by 6 2/3% for each year below the NRA. The NRA is currently age 
66 (for those born 1943-54, rising to 67 for people born 1960 and later). 
The SSA computes benefits by selecting a worker’s highest 35 years of earnings 
and indexing them so nominal earnings are adjusted to “near-current wage levels.”7  
Next, the agency computes the worker’s Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) 
over the 35-year period by averaging all indexed values (including zeros, if any) and 
dividing by 12.  Then the basic benefit or Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) is computed 
as a nonlinear function of the worker’s AIME; this is the base amount from which 
benefits are calculated. If the worker claims benefits at the NRA, his benefit equals 100% 
of his PIA.  However, if he claims at some younger age, his benefit amount is reduced by 
the 6 2/3% per year he claims early, and the reduction continues for the rest of his life.  
For instance, at age 62 he would receive a PIA reduced by 25%.8 Conversely, if he were 
to leave work but delay claiming beyond the NRA, his benefits are increased by 8% per 
year of age beyond the NRA for the remainder of his life; this is the Delayed Retirement 
Credit (DRC). 9   In other words, the age one stops working need not equal the age at 
which one claims benefits.10
                                                 
7 This is computed as the year in which a workers turns age 60; for more information, see 
 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/retirebenefit1.html  
8 Taken from http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/quickcalc/earlyretire.html. Benefits payable to spouses and 
survivors are also adjusted based on the covered worker’s claiming age, but we abstract from this in the 
present study (for more discussion see Coile et al. 2002 and Mahaney and Carlson 2008).    
9 In addition, Social Security benefits are annually adjusted for cost-of-living. 
10 And this difference is widely appreciated; see Greenwald et al. (2010). In practice, the majority of 
workers (over 90%) claim when first eligible at age 62; see Hurd and Rohwedder (2004) and Coile et al. 
(2002).  
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The intent of the early retirement reduction and delayed retirement credit 
adjustments is to recognize that early claimants on average will receive benefits for a 
longer period than those who delay claiming. These adjustments therefore seek to be 
roughly ‘actuarially neutral,’ so that people who take a lower benefit early would expect 
to receive, on average, about the same total amount in benefits over their lifetimes, 
compared to those who wait for the higher monthly benefit but start receiving it later. In 
other words, the choice of claiming age affects the monthly annuity stream, but for the 
population on average, it does not alter the expected total lifetime sum of benefits 
received.   
Other Factors Influencing the Claiming Decision 
 The prior discussion of the effect of claiming age on benefits, while accurate, is a 
simplification of the broader claiming decision.  In reality, there are a number of complex 
factors that go into the consideration of an optimal claiming date. 
 An important simplification is that this paper is focused specifically on the 
claiming decision, rather than the broader impact of benefit amounts on labor force 
participation.  Technically, the claiming decision is fully independent of one’s labor force 
participation status:  people need not claim upon leaving the labor force, and they need 
not be retired to claim.  In practice, of course, there are obvious connections between 
retirement and Social Security claiming decisions.  For example, if continue to stay in the 
labor force while delaying claiming, their monthly benefit may rise both because of the 
actuarial adjustment and because of the additional years of earnings potentially increasing 
one’s PIA.  Additionally, low-wealth, liquidity-constrained individuals may not have the 
resources to provide for their consumption after retirement if they did not claim Social 
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Security, and thus the claiming decision may be tightly linked with broader labor force 
participation concerns. 
Another reason that labor force participation and claiming are intertwined in 
practice is the Social Security “earnings test.”  As described by the Social Security 
Administration, if you continue to work after claiming benefits, and if you are younger 
than the Normal Retirement Age, “$1 in benefits will be deducted for each $2 you earn 
above the annual limit.”11 Importantly, the reduction in benefits that results from the 
application of the earnings test is “returned” to the beneficiary in the form of higher 
future benefits, although it is unclear how widely this feature is understood by those 
affected.12
While all of these factors – and others – are quite important to consider when 
evaluating an optimal retirement age, we abstract away from these considerations in our 
experimental design.  Doing so has a distinct advantage of keeping the experimental 
frames as clean and simple as possible.  Equally importantly, this simplification does not 
present a problem for our analysis for reasons that we will describe in more detail in the 
next section. 
  
 
III. Study Design 
Focus Groups 
                                                 
11 http://ssa-custhelp.ssa.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/236/~/effects-of-working-and-receiving-social-
security-retirement-benefits.  For 2010, the annual limit is $14,160.  In the year one reaches the normal 
retirement age, the reduction is $1 for every $3 above a higher limit, up until the month one reaches the 
NRA.  .     
12We also abstract from the possibility that an insured individual’s claiming decision may affect the after-
tax maximum family benefit received by the entire household.   
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Prior to launching our quantitative survey, we conducted a large number of focus 
groups in the Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. areas.  These 
focus groups served two distinct purposes.  The first purpose, and the one most relevant 
to this paper, is that we used these groups to ensure that the language we used in the 
frames that we ultimately tested in the online survey  (which can be found in Appendix A 
and discussed in Section IV below) was clear and salient to the participants.  Indeed, the 
focus groups were quite useful in this regard, and they helped us to develop frames that 
respondents considered distinct along the margins that we wished to test, while 
maintaining their symmetry along other dimensions. The second purpose of the focus 
groups was to gain an understanding of a broader set of issues related to how individuals 
view the role of Social Security in retirement.  While those findings are not discussed in 
the present paper, interested readers will find a summary of the qualitative findings in 
Greenwald & Associates (2010a).     
American Life Panel 
After testing our frames (to be discussed in more detail in Section IV, below), we 
fielded a survey through the RAND American Life Panel (ALP). The ALP is a sample of 
approximately 3,000 households who are regularly interviewed over the Internet. An 
advantage relative to most other Internet panels is that the ALP is mostly based on a 
probability sample of the US population.13
                                                 
13 ALP respondents have been recruited in one of three ways. Most were recruited from individuals age 18+ 
who were respondents to the Monthly Survey (MS) of the University of Michigan's Survey Research 
Center (SRC). The MS is the leading consumer sentiment survey that incorporates the long-standing 
Survey of Consumer Attitudes and produces, among others, the widely used Index of Consumer 
Expectations. Each month, the MS interviews approximately 500 households, of which 300 households are 
a random-digit-dial (RDD) sample and 200 are reinterviewed from the RDD sample surveyed six months 
previously. Until August 2008, SRC screened MS respondents by asking them if they would be willing to 
participate in a long term research project (with approximate response categories “no, certainly not,” 
“probably not,” “maybe,” “probably,” “yes, definitely”). If the response category is not “no, certainly not,” 
  Currently, the panel comprises over 3000 
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active panel members, of whom approximately 5% respond to the questionnaires using a 
WebTV.  
Experimental Design 
The experimental design consists of several separate waves of data collection. We 
initiated the survey with a “pre-wave” in June of 2010, in which respondents were asked 
a single question about when they expected to claim Social Security: 
“We would next like to ask you a question about a different topic. As you know, in the 
United States people can start claiming Social Security benefits between the ages of 62 
and 70. At what age would you expect to start collecting these Social Security benefits?” 
 
This question was asked to provide a baseline which we could then compare 
against responses to future frames, and also to help us evaluate whether our frame 
randomization which occurred thereafter was not biased with regard to the outcome of 
interest.14
                                                                                                                                                 
respondents were told that the University of Michigan is undertaking a joint project with RAND. They 
were asked if they would object to SRC sharing their information about them with RAND so that they 
could be contacted later and asked if they would be willing to actually participate in an Internet survey. 
Respondents who do not have Internet were told that RAND will provide them with free Internet. Many 
MS-respondents are interviewed twice. At the end of the second interview, an attempt was made to convert 
respondents who refused in the first round. This attempt includes the mention of the fact that participation 
in follow-up research carries a reward of $20 for each half-hour interview.  A subset of respondents 
(approximately 500) was recruited through a snowball sample; here respondents were given the opportunity 
to suggest friends or acquaintances who might also want to participate. Those friends were then contacted 
and asked if they wanted to participate. Respondents without Internet (both in the Michigan sample and the 
snowball respondents) were provided with so-called WebTVs (
   
http://www.webtv.com/pc/), which allows 
them to access the Internet using their television and a telephone line. The technology allows respondents 
who did not have previous Internet access to participate in the panel and furthermore use the WebTVs for 
browsing the Internet or use email. A new group of respondents (approximately 500) has recently been 
recruited after participating in the National Survey Project, created at Stanford University with SRBI. This 
sample was recruited in person, and at the end of their one-year participation, they were asked whether they 
were interested in joining the RAND American Life Panel. Most of these respondents were given a laptop 
and broadband Internet access. Recently, the American Life Panel has begun recruiting based on a random 
mail and telephone sample using the Dillman method (see e.g. Dillman et al, 2008) with the goal to achieve 
5000 active panel members, including a 1000 Spanish language subsample. If these new participants do not 
have Internet access yet, they will also be provided with a laptop and broadband Internet access. These 
panel members are not part of the sample used in this paper.  
14 While most respondents (95%) provided an answer in the age 62-70 range, some did not. When 
respondents did not answer in this age range, a follow-up question asked why not. Responses outside the 
62-70 interval were often given by younger respondents who believe that, by the time they will be eligible, 
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As described in detail in Section IV below, we test 10 different question frames. 
In three waves spaced at least two weeks apart, respondents are shown six different 
frames (two distinct frames per wave). These frames are randomly assigned in the 
following way: for each respondent we drew six numbers randomly without replacement 
from the set {1,2,…10}. These numbers determined which frames were shown to each 
respondent and in which order. For example, if we drew the vector (5, 7, 3, 9, 10, 6) for a 
given respondent, then that respondent is shown frames 5 and 7 in the first wave, frames 
3 and 9 in the second wave, and frames 10 and 6 in the third wave. The frames are only 
asked of respondent who have not already claimed a benefit and who have worked at 
least 10 years (so that we can compute a projected Social Security benefit). 
 
IV. The Frames 
In what follows, we explain the rationale for the choice of these particular frames, 
as well as our expectations about how alternative framing would affect the claiming 
decision. (The actual text of each of the frames tested appears in Appendix A.)   
Our baseline case is intended to be an approximation of Social Security’s current 
“neutral” stance on claiming ages.  This is differentiated from what we call here the 
“breakeven” approach, which was used by SSA for many decades and which continues to 
be used by many financial advisors in the private sector.  Next we discuss the three 
dimensions along which we vary our experimental frames, including: (i) the use of 
consumption language versus investment language, (ii) framing actuarial adjustments for 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Social Security claiming age will have moved to higher ages, or they believe they will not receive any 
Social Security benefit at all and express this by responding outside the range. 
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earlier and later claiming as gains versus losses, and (iii) the use of alternative anchoring 
ages (including ages 62, 66 and 70). 
a. Baseline Case: Symmetric Treatment of Gains and Losses (Anchored at Age 66) 
Our baseline case is modeled on the Social Security Administration’s current 
approach (in use since 2008) to discussing claiming ages (although we have simplified 
and shortened the presentation considerably for survey purposes).  In essence, this 
approach seeks to simply and clearly lay out “the facts” in a neutral manner, with a 
symmetric treatment of earlier and later claiming.  This approach is consistent with the 
SSA’s emphasis on providing information but not advice to participants, in that it clearly 
seeks to avoid biasing individuals in any particular direction.  Rather, it simply states the 
impact on benefits of claiming at various ages.    Because this frame is intended to be 
neutral, and because it reflects the current public perspective of SSA on claiming ages, 
we use this frame as the baseline against which other frames are compared. 
b.“Breakeven Analysis” (Anchored at Age 62) 
Previous to 2008, one of the tools used by the SSA when providing information 
on the impact of claiming at various ages was to use a so-called “breakeven” analysis.  
Under this approach, individuals were told what their benefit would be at an early age 
(e.g., 62) and some later age (e.g., 63).  They were then informed that, by delaying 
claiming from 62 to 63, they would “forfeit” a year of benefits.15
                                                 
15 SSA field offices have long been equipped with a software program that claims representatives can use to 
compute break-even dates for individuals who inquired about how benefits changed with the claiming date 
(known by SSA as “month of election,” or MOEL).  Numerous conversations we have held with SSA field 
office representatives suggest that this break-even analysis was widely used prior to 2008.  Indeed, the use 
of the break-even analysis was codified in the training manuals for employees: as recently as 2007, the 
training manual for Title II Claims Representatives (i.e., SSA employees who help citizens claim benefits, 
among other responsibilities) includd a discussion of documentation required for “Month of Election” 
(MOEL) cases.  It states “if the claimant chooses the later of the two possible MOELs, he will forfeit the 
benefits he could have received with the earlier MOEL” (emphasis added).  
  In return for the 
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deferral, they would receive a higher monthly benefit from age 63 on.  But the breakeven  
presentation emphasized that people would not come out ahead unless they lived until at 
least to age X, where X was defined as the age at which the cumulative nominal benefit 
payouts received were equal.  This approach combines some elements of both the 
negative annuity framing explored by Agnew et al (2008) and the investment frame 
explored by Brown et al (2008), both of which have been shown to reduce the perceived 
desirability of annuitization.   
While this breakeven analysis was accurate, it is also true that the framing of this 
approach implicitly places zero value on the insurance aspect of delaying claiming.  In 
essence, it provided a simplistic financial calculation which emphasized that later 
claimers would be “behind,” until they reached a far distant breakeven date.  As a result, 
this approach placed little emphasis on the additional value that individuals who deferred 
could receive for the rest of their lives beyond the breakeven date.  This practice is akin 
to considering only the actuarial aspect of the decision, without taking into account the 
broader utility rewards of an annuity, which arise from risk aversion and protection 
against longevity risk.  Indeed, in direct contrast to highlighting the insurance aspects of 
Social Security, this approach frames the decision to delay claiming more as a gamble, 
the outcome of which depends upon how long one lives.   
It is worth noting that this breakeven approach is not unique to the Social Security 
Administration; in fact a widely referenced article by the Schwab Center for Financial 
Research (2010)16
                                                 
16 For further information see 
 also discusses the claiming decision using a breakeven analysis.  Our 
http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/research_strategies/market_insight/retirement_strategies/planning/
when_should_you_take_social_security.html 
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hypothesis is that this breakeven approach is likely to bias individuals toward claiming 
benefits earlier, than would a more neutrally worded frame. 
c. Consumption versus Investment   
As noted earlier, in a prior study Brown et al. (2008) showed that how individuals 
view the value of life annuities relative to other financial products depends on whether 
annuities are presented in a “consumption frame” or an “investment frame.”  That is, 
when consumers are conditioned to think in terms of investments (e.g., when the 
presentation uses investment terminology such as “invest” and “return”), the life 
annuities are made to appear unattractive.  This is because life annuities are then 
perceived as paying low returns, being illiquid, and possibly even seeming “risky” 
(because the amount an annuitant gets back depends on how long he lives).  By contrast, 
in a consumption frame (e.g., a frame that emphasizes one’s ability to consume 
throughout life), a life annuity tends to be viewed as a very attractive form of insurance.   
While Brown et al. (2008) found powerful effects on the attractiveness of life 
annuities relative to non-annuitized products, that analysis did not provide evidence on 
whether these alternative frames have an effect on the desirability of “earlier” versus 
“later” annuitization.  But given the magnitude of the effects they found (roughly 70% of 
respondents preferring a life annuity to a savings account in a consumption frame, versus 
about 20% in an investment frame), this distinction is potentially quite important to the 
Social Security claiming context.  It is worth noting that the break-even frame is itself a 
quite negative form of an investment frame, one that emphasizes the risk of not living 
long enough to recoup one’s lost year of benefits.  The investment language used in these 
additional frames focuses on “returns” but without explicating pointing out the “risk” of 
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not breaking even.  This will allow us to determine whether it is the break-even analysis 
per se, or the investment-oriented language more generally, that influences claiming 
behavior.   
d. Gains versus Losses 
The asymmetry in how individuals treat gains versus losses is one of the best-
known results (at least among economists) from the psychology literature on choice.  
Most prominently, Kahneman and Tversky (1981) found that individuals exhibited an 
asymmetry between gains and losses.  Specifically, they found in a situation of choice 
under uncertainty that people sometimes exhibit a preference for a certain gain of $ *p X   
to an uncertain gain of $X with probability p, while at the same time preferring an 
uncertain loss of $X  with probability p, to a certain loss of $ *p X .   
Relating this to the context of benefit claiming, it is possible to express actuarial 
adjustments in terms of a gain (e.g., delaying claiming by one year will increase your 
benefit by $X  per month) or a loss (e.g., claiming one year earlier will reduce your 
benefit by $X  per month).  Accordingly, we expect that this gain/loss distinction may 
have important interactions with the consumption/investment distinction.  As noted by 
Brown et al. (2008), additional annuitization may look very attractive in a consumption 
frame, while it may look less attractive in an investment frame.  It is also, therefore, 
possible that gains and losses will be interpreted differently in each of these contexts.   
e. Age Anchors 
As discussed at length by Mussweiler et al. (2004), “anchoring effects pervade a 
variety of judgments, from the trivial (i.e., estimates of the mean temperature in 
Antarctica) … to the apocalyptic (i.e., estimates of the likelihood of nuclear war) … In 
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particular, they have been observed in a broad array of different judgmental domains, 
such as general-knowledge questions, price estimates, estimates of self-efficacy, 
probability assessments, evaluations of lotteries and gambles, legal judgment, and 
negotiation.”17
f. The Ten Different Frames  
  In our context, a very natural and salient anchoring point is the age that is 
first presented in each frame.  Given that we are exploring both gains and losses, some 
variation in anchoring ages is useful.  For example, while one can easily discuss gains in 
a frame anchored at age 62, it is not possible to anchor a loss frame at 62 because 62 is 
the earliest claiming age, and thus there is no way to characterize a loss from claiming 
earlier than this.  Similarly, it is easy to anchor losses at age 70 (the maximum claiming 
age), but not gains.  For this reason, in the experimental treatments that we describe next, 
the gain frames are anchored at 62, and the loss frames at 70.  In order to distinguish the 
gain/loss hypothesis from age anchoring, we also include both gain and loss frames that 
are anchored at age 66.   
Putting these various permutations together results in 10 distinct frames, 
described more completely in the Appendix.  Below we refer to these frames as follows: 
(i) Baseline (neutral) 
(ii) Breakeven  
(iii) Consumption Gain from Age 62 
(iv) Consumption Gain from Age 66 
(v) Consumption Loss from Age 66 
(vi) Consumption Loss from Age 70 
(vii) Investment Gain from Age 62 
(viii) Investment Gain from Age 66 
(ix) Investment Loss from Age 66 
(x) Investment Loss from Age 70 
 
                                                 
17 We have excluded the references included in the original quote.  For these, as well as a full description of  
findings, see: http://social-cognition.uni-koeln.de/scc4/documents/PsychPr_04.pdf. 
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g. How our Experimental Design Handles Complexity and Heterogeneity 
 As discussed above, there will be heterogeneity in the optimal claiming date 
based on differences in economic situations as well as preferences.  Heterogeneity also 
results from the numerous “real-life” complicating factors that would rationally influence 
the choice of an optimal claiming date, including the labor force participation issues, the 
earnings test, and spousal or child benefits.    
 Fortunately, our experimental design does not require that we know the optimal 
claiming date for any individual.  Furthermore, our design allows us to dramatically 
simplify the scenarios that individuals face (including focusing on a single individual and 
avoiding a discussion of the earnings test).  
 There are three reasons that our design does not require that we specific all 
relevant information.  First, our experimental design is premised on the idea that if an 
individual is making a rational optimizing decision, that optimal decision will be based 
on how (possibly unobservable) factors important to that individual map into utility 
outcomes.  Because our framing experiment holds the relevant outcomes fixed in all 
cases, and only changes the way the claiming process is framed, optimizing individuals 
would be insensitive to frame changes.  While the omission of a discussion of the 
earnings test, for example, might lead to answers that differ from those that the 
respondent would give if such information was provided, it is important to emphasize that 
the same information is provided or omitted in all frames, and we are examining 
differences across frames in how the same information is presented. 
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 Second, we randomize individuals into various treatment groups.  Thus, there are 
no concerns about self-selection based on differences in the salience of the complicating 
factors that we have simplified away.   
Third, because we expose individuals to multiple frames, we are able to conduct 
some analyses including individual fixed effects, meaning that we are implicitly 
controlling for all unobservable differences across individuals.   
In essence, our identifying assumption is that any biases introduced into the 
expected claiming age by our omission of some factors are independent of how the 
information that we are providing is framed.   
 
V.  Results 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the ALP sample used in the experiment; 
we also provide average expected claiming ages reported by respondents about six weeks 
before the start of the experiment (the June 2010 question discussed in Section III).  Here 
and in the remainder of the paper, claiming ages are expressed in terms of the number of 
months after the date when the respondent turns 62. Thus for example a “claiming age” 
of 36 means age 65 and zero months (which is 36 months after one’s 62nd
A few points are worth noting from the third column of Table 1. First, women 
indicate that they plan to claim Social Security benefits about four months later than men.  
Planned claiming ages also rise with education and income: in both cases, those in the 
highest category say they intend to claim benefits about 15-16 months later than the 
lowest category. Planned claiming ages are also slightly later for younger respondents. 
Thus those younger than age 50 say they plan to claim about two to four months later 
 birthday.)   
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than respondents over age 55. This is likely an underestimate of the population 
difference, since our sample is restricted to individuals not yet retired (so anyone over 55 
who self-described himself as retired is not included).  These summary statistics are 
offered for general interest, though it is worth noting that, because we randomize 
exposure to the frames, we would not anticipate that these baseline differences will have 
any impact on results across frames.  Further, in specifications that include individual 
fixed effects, these differences will be directly controlled.   
Table 1 here 
Figure 1 shows average expected claiming ages arrayed by frame across the six 
presentations.  One can see quite clearly that the breakeven frame yields – by far – the 
earliest intended claiming age. There is also a suggestion of a difference between gain 
and loss frames, where the gain frames yield a somewhat later claiming age than the loss 
frames. Below we verify these results using multivariate regression models. 
Figure 1 here 
Table 2 presents average claiming ages for the various frames administered to the 
ALP broken down by treatment, and Figure 2 shows the same information in the form of 
a bar chart. Once again, the “breakeven” frame generates by far the lowest claiming age. 
For example, in wave 1.1 (the first treatment in the first wave), the breakeven frame 
generates a claiming age that is between 22 and 26 months earlier than the claiming age 
generated by the frames that take 66 as an anchoring age.  
Table 2 and Figure 2 here 
We are aware that there could be some ‘spillover’ from the first to the second 
treatment within a wave. That is, when reading the second frame presented in a wave, the 
respondent might remember what he answered when shown the first frame, and possibly 
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even offer the exact same age. Our data do indeed reveal many instances where 
respondents’ first and second answers within a wave are identical. Below we analyze this 
pattern more formally.  Spillovers help explain for instance why the claiming age 
associated with the breakeven frame is quite a bit higher in 1.2 (wave 1, exposure 2) and 
2.2, than in 1.1 and 2.1, respectively.  
Table 3 and Figures 3-6 report intended claiming ages (now averaged across all 
waves) by frame and demographics and show that there are some differences (below we 
test for significance more formally). Women tend to be somewhat more responsive to the 
difference between gain frames and loss frames than men, deferring intended claiming 
ages more when benefit enhancements are emphasized. Younger people and less 
educated individuals appear to be more responsive to framing than older people and 
respondents with a college degree. The last column in Table 3 shows the variance of the 
average claiming ages across the ten frames, which we interpret as a measure of how 
sensitive respondents are to the different frames. The variance proves to be considerably 
larger for less-educated respondents than for respondents with a college degree, 
suggesting that respondents with a lower education are more susceptible to framing 
effects. The age pattern is not quite monotonic, but it does suggest more susceptibility to 
framing among the young versus the older respondents.  
Table 3 and Figures 3-6 here 
It is useful to summarize these differences using multivariate regression analyses, 
with results appearing in Table 4.  In all five columns, the dependent variable is the 
number of months after age 62 that the respondent indicates he intends to claim his Social 
Security benefits. The first three columns of Table 4 present results from regression 
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analyses pertaining to the first wave.  In the first two columns, we regress the number of 
months a respondent indicates he will claim post-62 on nine treatment dummies, one for 
each frame, with the omitted category being the baseline frame (which uses an anchoring 
age of 66 and describes the effects of changing claiming ages in symmetric terms). In the 
first column, the dependent variable is the answer to the first frame in the wave (i.e. wave 
1.1), while in the second column, the dependent variable is the response to the second 
frame in the wave (wave 1.2). As noted before, it is possible that responses to the second 
frame in a given wave could be influenced by responses to the first frame, so in the third 
column of Table 4 we use as the dependent variable the answer to the second frame 
exposure and also control for which frame the respondent saw in the first frame. These 
“lagged” dummy variables are statistically significant (p=.02) though a comparison of the 
second and third columns suggests that the estimates of the treatment effects are not 
much affected. 
Table 4 here 
When combining results across waves, it is important to account for correlations 
across observations that refer to the same respondents. A natural solution is to include 
individual fixed effects, and results are given in columns 4 and 5 of Table 4.  Accordingly 
column 4 combines the results of all six waves, while column 5 once again includes 
dummies for preceding treatments for waves 1.2, 2.2, and 3.2. That is, when the 
dependent variable refers to wave 1.2, the treatment in wave 1.1 is included as an extra 
explanatory variable; similarly for wave 2.2, the treatment in 2.1 is included as an 
explanatory variable, and similarly for waves 3.2 and 3.1. The coefficients on these 
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lagged treatments are not reported, but they operate in the expected direction and are 
highly significant (p=.00). 
The finding of most interest in Table 4 is that several of the treatment frame 
coefficients differ significantly from that on the neutral frame where the anchoring age is 
66. The models confirm that the breakeven SSA frame leads to substantially earlier 
claiming – compared to the neutral frame, the breakeven frame appears to induce 
claiming around 15 months earlier. This is an enormous impact, one that should be of 
substantial interest to policymakers who seek to offer the best unbiased advice possible to 
the working public. 
It appears that the gain frames with anchoring at 66 yields the highest claiming 
age, though several others also generate significantly later claiming ages than the neutral 
frame – specifically the loss frames with anchoring at 70. We also note that gain frames 
appear to lead to later claiming than do loss frames. The difference between the gain 
frames at 66 and the loss frames at 66 are statistically significant (p=.01). 
An alternative way to disentangle the effects of anchoring ages, gain vs. loss, and 
consumption vs. investment, is provided in Table 5.  Here we present the results of a 
fixed effect analysis with the control variables now redefined to represent framing 
dimensions (e.g., gain versus loss, or anchoring ages) rather than individual frames.  As 
before, the second column regression includes dummies for the preceding treatments 
when the dependent variable refers to waves 1.2 and 2.2 (and these “lagged treatment 
effects” are highly significant (p=.00), although the estimates in which we are most 
interested are very similar with or without them.)  The joint tests reported in Table 5 
show that the gain and loss frames have different effects, depending on when an 
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individual first says he is intending to claim. That is, gain frames lead to later claiming 
ages than loss frames. The null hypothesis that consumption and investment frames have 
equal effects cannot be rejected. Anchoring ages 66 and 70 are both associated with 
significantly later claiming ages, compared to anchoring at age 62. The difference 
between 66 and 70 is not significantly different from zero however. 
Table 5 here  
 Two additional tables permit us to test whether sub-groups of people respond 
differently to the manner in which benefits claiming is framed.  Table 6 provides one 
approach, wherein we adopt the same fixed effects model as in Table 5 but also add four 
additional variables, namely interaction terms between the breakeven frame and sex, the 
individual’s predicted benefit level if he claimed at age 62,  a third variable indicating 
whether a respondent reports to have credit card debt, and a fourth variable, which is a 
measure of financial literacy.18
 In the first column, we see that compared to men, women are prompted to claim 
six months earlier when they see the breakeven frame versus the neutral frame, and the 
effect is statistically significant. (It will be recalled that these are fixed effects estimates, 
so individual-specific factors are differenced out.)  The second column shows the impact 
 Since the neutral frame is the reference category, one may 
interpret the coefficient on the interaction variables as the effect of the factor on the 
difference between the neutral frame and the breakeven frame.  
                                                 
18 Specifically the interest_efficacy variable is also derived from the ALP and asks people the following 
question: When making decisions about personal finances, how likely is it that you would be able to 
effectively take into account the impact of interest compounding? 
1 Extremely likely 
2 Very likely 
3 Somewhat likely 
4 Very unlikely 
5 Extremely unlikely 
We coded the first two categories as 1 and the others as 0, 
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of interacting respondents’ anticipated monthly Social Security benefits at age 62 (the 
mean of that variable is $1,275.). The statistically significant estimate implies that if the 
monthly benefit level were to rise from $1,275 to $2,275, this would narrow the gap 
between the neutral and the breakeven frame by 8 months.  The third column shows that 
individuals with credit card debt are significantly more sensitive to the difference in 
framing between neutral and breakeven (the difference widens by about 4.5 months). One 
possible interpretation of this is that individuals with credit card debt find financial 
management more challenging, and are thus more affected by framing. Finally, in the 
fourth column we show the interaction between a financial literacy variable and the 
breakeven frame. The financial literacy variable simply counts the number of correct 
answers to a sequence of 17 financial literacy questions. 19
Table 6 here 
 The interaction is not 
statistically significant, although potentially of quantitative significance. For instance if a 
respondent moves from 50% correct to 100% correct, the gap between the neutral frame 
and breakeven narrows by 7.25 months. (Mean percent correct in the sample is 68 in the 
sample).  
 Finally, in Table 7 we offer a more complex set of additional interaction terms, 
again using a fixed effects framework obviating the need for non-time-varying controls. 
Multicollinearity results from including such a large set of interactions, though the joint 
test of the interaction terms reported at the bottom of the table indicates that the 
significant differences by age and sex (at at least the 10% level) persist even in this more 
complex case. And the anchoring age interactions are also quite significant.   
                                                 
19 The 17 questions measure knowledge in five domains: compound interest (4 questions), inflation (2 
questions), risk diversification (3 questions), tax treatment of DC savings (4 questions), and employer 
matches of DC contributions (4 questions). 
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Table 7 here 
 
VI. Conclusions  
We draw two primary conclusions from this project, one of them of interest to 
academics, and the other of practical interest to policymakers and financial advisers. The 
academic conclusion is that individuals appear to be behaving in a manner that is 
inconsistent with purely rational economic optimizing behavior.  Were individuals 
focusing solely on consumption outcomes, as standard life-cycle models posit, then such 
decisions would be unaffected by how information is framed.  Instead, the evidence 
strongly suggests that how claiming information is framed has a strong influence on 
expected claiming behavior. 
The practical lesson to draw from these findings is that the manner in which 
information is provided to plan participants can strongly shape behavior.  As a result, a 
group seeking to provide participants with what is believed to be unbiased information 
might (intentionally or unintentionally) influence those decisions in important ways.  
Indeed this research suggests – at least as a real possibility – that Social Security’s 
historical emphasis on “breakeven analysis” may have inadvertently encouraged several 
generations of American workers to claim benefits earlier than they would have done had 
the information been presented in a different frame.  It is especially important to 
understand these effects because – unlike the benefit rules themselves – the framing of 
information is under the control of the SSA staff and administration, rather than 
something requiring Congressional legislation to alter. 
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We recognize that a limitation of this research is that it relies on stated intentions 
about future claiming behavior, rather than on actual claiming decisions.  In principle, it 
would be possible to design an experiment that would allow SSA to test the impact of 
framing on actual claiming decisions, especially now that many retirement benefit claims 
are processed using internet-based on-line claiming.  Such “real world” experiments 
might be a very promising avenue for future analysis. 
Another area for future investigation would be to examine other 
 
information 
provided that might also inadvertently influence claiming behavior.  For example, Brown 
and Weisbenner (2008) point out that the current framing of the Windfall Elimination 
Provision (WEP) may have the unintended consequence of making individuals affected 
by the WEP feel (incorrectly) as if they are being denied benefits they have earned.  
Another example where framing might influence decision-making is with regard to the 
Social Security earnings test,  which some appear to (incorrectly) view as a “tax” rather 
than a reallocation of benefits to the same individual across time. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics on the ALP Sample  
 
Frequency Percentage Mean Claiming Age 
GENDER 
  
(months>62) 
1 Male 598 41.6 39 
2 Female 839 58.4 43 
AGE 1437 100 
 18-40 388 27 42 
41-50 405 28.2 42 
51-55 275 19.1 38 
>55 369 25.7 40 
EDUCATION 1437 100 
 HS or less 232 16.1 35 
Some college/ associate degree 577 40.2 39 
College degree 628 43.7 50 
HH INCOME 1437 100 
 <35000 302 21.1 31 
35000-74999 592 41.2 43 
>75000 541 37.7 47 
Note: Table contains demographics for respondents to Wave 1. Mean claiming ages are based on 
slightly fewer observations, due to missing claiming ages. Means are weighted 
  
 
Table 2. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Wave   
 
Frame Wave 1.1 Wave 1.2 Wave 2.1Wave 2.2 Wave 3.1 Wave 3.2
Breakeven 39.6 47.9 41.6 45.0 44.1 46.9
66 neutral, c 54.5 57.6 58.5 60.8 61.1 64.2
62, gain, c 58.7 65.5 60.5 65.9 60.1 64.5
66, gain, c 62.7 63.3 61.2 64.0 59.4 64.1
70, loss, c 57.2 57.5 56.1 55.3 62.7 52.3
66, loss, c 65.3 61.5 57.7 63.3 53.6 59.3
62, gain, i 58.4 63.3 57.0 67.3 57.4 64.8
66, gain, i 63.1 62.2 60.3 65.9 66.1 60.4
70, loss, i 57.7 57.9 54.4 57.4 53.2 52.9
66, loss, i 62.2 61.5 59.2 61.1 61.7 57.1
Notes: Ages are expressed in months past age 62.
frames; “gain” or “loss” indicate if loss or gain frames were used; 
 “c” indicates a consumption frame, while “i” indicates an investment fram 
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Table 3. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Characteristics   
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted data. See Table 2 for 
additional definitions. 
FRAME 
 Breakeven 
66 
neutral, 
cons 
62, 
gain, 
cons 
66, 
gain, 
cons 
70, 
loss, 
cons 
66, 
loss, 
cons 
62, 
gain, 
inv 
66, 
gain, 
inv 
70, 
loss, 
inv 
66, 
loss, 
inv Variance 
GENDER            
Male 45.7 59.9 61.1 62.8 56.2 60.3 60.7 60.5 55.1 59.3 24.4 
Female 42.8 58.5 63.7 62.4 56.9 60.2 61.7 64.9 55.8 61.4 40.0 
AGE GROUP            
18-40 44.5 63.2 63.7 67.3 63.2 64.4 62.7 68 58.8 65.4 44.9 
41-50 46.1 63.1 64.5 65.3 60.4 63.5 63.6 67.2 59.4 63.3 34.7 
51-55 40.4 59 60.4 59.9 55.4 58 62.1 62.9 53.4 58.6 42.2 
>55 43.9 49.7 60.8 56.3 47.6 53 56 53.3 50.1 53.6 23.2 
EDUCATION            
HS or less 38.5 55.4 60.2 60.6 52.7 57.8 55.9 57.9 55.6 59 40.9 
Some college/ 
associate 
degree 40.8 55.8 61.9 60 56.8 59.5 61.1 59.8 51.9 57.1 39.0 
College degree 48.8 63.2 64.2 65.5 58.1 61.6 63.2 67.5 58.7 64 28.0 
HH INCOME            
<35000 44.3 58.9 63.6 60.7 56.5 58.6 59.2 62.2 57.4 60.7 28.4 
35000-74999 43.2 58.7 61.7 63 56 60.6 60.9 62.2 54.1 61.2 35.6 
>75000 44.9 59.6 62.9 62.9 57.3 60.6 62.6 64.3 56.1 59.6 31.6 
OVERALL            
Average  44.1 59.1 62.6 62.5 56.6 60.2 61.3 63 55.5 60.5  
Standard 
Deviation 31.5 29.5 28.9 30.3 29.9 31.2 28.6 30.1 30.3 30.4  
Frequency 744 736 838 777 754 769 811 807 719 779  
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Table 4. Framing Regressions: Dependent Variable is Expected Claiming Age 
Note: Dependent variable is expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted data. 
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text). Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  See Table 2 and text for additional definitions. 
 
FRAME Wave 1.1 Wave 1.2 Wave 1.2, 
lagged 
dummies 
included 
All waves, 
fixed 
effects 
All waves, 
fixed effects, 
lagged dummies 
included 
Breakeven -14.969 -9.695 -10.333 -15.696 -15.932 
 (4.29)** (2.62)** (2.79)** (16.03)** (16.21)** 
62_gain_c 4.150 7.918 8.542 1.053 1.031 
 (1.19) (2.26)* (2.43)* (1.12) (1.09) 
66_gain_c 8.191 5.711 6.467 3.736 3.988 
 (2.44)* (1.60) (1.82) (3.88)** (4.13)** 
70_loss_c 2.674 -0.074 0.581 2.740 2.920 
 (0.78) (0.02) (0.16) (2.81)** (2.98)** 
66_loss_c 10.791 3.957 4.947 1.300 1.641 
 (3.03)** (1.09) (1.37) (1.35) (1.70) 
62_gain_i 3.823 5.713 6.078 0.359 0.460 
 (1.11) (1.63) (1.73) (0.38) (0.48) 
66_gain_i 8.546 4.683 5.229 3.321 3.623 
 (2.47)* (1.26) (1.41) (3.50)** (3.80)** 
70-loss-i 3.113 0.351 1.700 1.948 2.326 
 (0.79) (0.09) (0.45) (1.98)* (2.35)* 
66-loss-i 7.652 3.903 4.501 1.060 1.282 
 (2.12)* (1.04) (1.20) (1.10) (1.33) 
Constant 54.540 57.557 53.121 58.643 57.903 
 (22.22)** (22.34)** (14.18)** (85.40)** (81.98)** 
Observations 1436 1417 1417 7734 7734 
R-squared 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.10 
p gain at 62 
cons=inv 
0.92 0.51 0.465 0.45 0.538 
p gain at 66 
cons=inv 
0.916 0.778 0.735 0.657 0.698 
p loss at 70 
cons=inv 
0.911 0.909 0.764 0.416 0.545 
p loss at 66 
cons=inv 
0.395 0.988 0.904 0.801 0.708 
p cons at 66 
gain=loss 
0.452 0.620 0.666 0.011 0.015 
p inv at 66 
gain=loss 
0.804 0.839 0.849 0.016 0.013 
p joint 
cons=inv 
0.944 0.971 0.944 0.827 0.903 
p joint 
gain=loss 
0.969 0.884 0.862 0.010 0.009 
Number of id    1665 1665 
p previous 
dummies zero 
  0.02  0.00 
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Table 5. Framing contrasts (Fixed Effect Models, All Waves: Dependent Variable is 
Expected Claiming Age)  
Note: Dependent variable measured in number of months after age 62, unweighted data. 
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text).  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  See Table 2 for additional definitions. 
 
Table 5: Framing contrasts, fixed effects, all waves 
 All waves All waves, lagged 
dummies included 
Breakeven -12.876 -12.881 
 (10.94)** (10.90)** 
cons_loss 1.435 1.695 
 (1.59) (1.87) 
cons_gain 3.807 4.031 
 (4.23)** (4.47)** 
inv_loss 0.927 1.222 
 (1.03) (1.35) 
inv_gain 3.250 3.557 
 (3.64)** (3.98)** 
anchor_62 -2.822 -3.070 
 (4.30)** (4.65)** 
anchor_70 1.167 1.159 
 (1.70) (1.67) 
Constant 58.643 57.914 
 (85.41)** (82.04)** 
Observations 7734 7734 
Number of id 1665 1665 
R-squared 0.09 0.10 
p cons_loss=gain 0.00 0.005 
p inv_loss=gain 0.004 0.005 
p gain_cons=inv 0.395 0.474 
p loss_cons=inv 0.456 0.489 
p anchor62=70 0.000 0.000 
p joint gain=loss 0.002 0.002 
p joint cons=inv 0.525 0.607 
p previous dummies 
zero 
 0.00 
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Table 6. Fixed Effect Models With Interactions, All Waves: Dependent Variable is 
Expected Claiming Age  
Note: Dependent variable measured in number of months after age 62, unweighted data. 
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text). Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  See Table 2 for additional definitions. 
FRAME (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Breakeven -9.633 -23.383 -10.681 -16.790 
 (6.79)** (7.60)** (7.78)** (5.70)** 
Loss_c 1.432 1.412 1.425 1.120 
 (1.59) (1.57) (1.58) (1.19) 
Gain_c 3.796 3.781 3.798 3.660 
 (4.23)** (4.21)** (4.23)** (3.91)** 
Loss_i 0.927 0.918 0.912 0.916 
 (1.03) (1.02) (1.01) (0.97) 
Gain_i 3.253 3.227 3.257 3.110 
 (3.65)** (3.62)** (3.65)** (3.33)** 
anchor_62 -2.808 -2.807 -2.831 -2.837 
 (4.28)** (4.28)** (4.32)** (4.13)** 
anchor_70 1.171 1.180 1.169 1.160 
 (1.71) (1.72) (1.71) (1.62) 
Female* breakeven  -5.928    
 (4.08)**    
Benefit62* Breakeven   0.008   
  (3.70)**   
Cred. card debt* Breakeven   -4.485  
   (3.10)**  
Fin. literacy* Breakeven    0.055 
    (1.50) 
Constant 58.645 58.660 58.652 58.550 
 (85.52)** (85.52)** (85.48)** (81.57)** 
Observations 7734 7734 7734 6994 
Number of id 1665 1665 1665 1445 
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
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Table 7. Fixed Effect Models With Interactions, All Waves: Dependent Variable is 
Expected Claiming Age  
Note: Dependent variable measured in number of months after age 62, unweighted data. 
Reference frame is Age 66, neutral (see text).Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses; * 
significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  See Table 2 for additional definitions. 
 (1) (2) 
Breakeven -12.876 -14.072 
 (10.94)** (3.28)** 
Loss_c 1.435 -4.397 
 (1.59) (1.36) 
Gain_c 3.807 -0.138 
 (4.23)** (0.04) 
Loss_i 0.927 -5.194 
 (1.03) (1.60) 
Gain_i 3.250 -1.695 
 (3.64)** (0.52) 
anchor_62 -2.822 -5.863 
 (4.30)** (2.42)* 
anchor_70 1.167 0.740 
 (1.70) (0.30) 
Female*Breakeven  -5.748 
  (2.41)* 
Female*Loss_c  0.474 
  (0.26) 
female*Gain_c  -0.525 
  (0.29) 
female*Loss_i  2.621 
  (1.43) 
female*Gain_i  0.990 
  (0.55) 
Female*anchor_66  -0.782 
  (0.58) 
Female*anchor_70  -0.910 
  (0.47) 
agecat2*Breakeven  3.187 
  (1.04) 
agecat2*Loss_c  -0.311 
  (0.13) 
agecat2*Gain_c  0.046 
  (0.02) 
agecat2*Loss_i  0.229 
  (0.09) 
agecat2*Gain_i  0.135 
  (0.06) 
agecat2*anchor_66  -2.931 
  (1.70) 
agecat2*anchor_70  -0.582 
  (0.23) 
agecat3*Breakeven  2.394 
  (0.70) 
agecat3*Loss_c  -0.545 
  (0.20) 
agecat3*Gain_c  0.178 
35 
 
 
  (0.07) 
agecat3*Loss_i  -1.243 
  (0.47) 
agecat3*Gain_i  1.340 
  (0.53) 
agecat3*anchor_66  -1.582 
  (0.83) 
agecat3*anchor_70  1.687 
  (0.60) 
agecat4*Breakeven  5.881 
  (1.81) 
agecat4*Loss_c  -1.686 
  (0.66) 
agecat4*Gain_c  0.977 
  (0.38) 
agecat4*Loss_i  1.133 
  (0.44) 
agecat4*Gain_i  -0.748 
  (0.30) 
agecat4*anchor_66  -2.272 
  (1.23) 
agecat4*anchor_70  -1.717 
  (0.65) 
Constant 58.643 61.715 
 (85.41)** (25.55)** 
Observations 7734 7723 
Number of id 1665 1663 
R-squared 0.09 0.10 
p Loss_c=gain 0.00  
p Loss_i=gain 0.004  
p Gain_c=inv 0.395 0.53 
p Loss_c=inv 0.456 0.743 
p anchor62=70 0.000  
p joint gain=loss 0.002 0.275 
p joint cons=inv 0.525 0.777 
p income interactions  0.674 
p education interactions  0.122 
p age interactions  0.098 
p sex interactions  0.003 
p anchor66=70  0.056 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Figure 1. Average Expected Claiming Ages by Frame  
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted. 
 
 
Figure 2. Average Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Wave 
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted. 
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Figure 3. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Sex 
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Age  
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted. 
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Figure 5. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Education (unweighted) 
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Expected Claiming Ages by Frame and Respondent Income ($) 
Note: Expressed as number of months after age 62, unweighted. 
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Appendix: The Ten Frames 
 
Frame 1: Baseline (Neutral) 
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Frame 2: Breakeven 
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Frame 3: 62, gain, consumption 
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Frame 4: 66, gain, consumption 
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Frame 5: 70, loss, consumption 
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Frame 6: 66, loss, consumption 
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Frame 7: 62, gain, investment 
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Frame 8: 66, gain, investment 
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Frame 9: 70, loss, investment 
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Frame 10: 66, loss, investment 
 
 
 
